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DEFINING "PROPERTY" IN THE JUST
COMPENSATION CLAUSE
D. BENJAMIN BARROS*
INTRODUCrION
In the time since the landmark Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,'
the only certainty in the area of regulatory takings2 is that a regulation
can, in some circumstances, be considered a taking of private prop-
erty. Failing to devise a coherent test for regulatory takings, the
Supreme Court repeatedly has claimed to be making determinations
based on the facts of the particular case.3 This ad hoc, factual ap-
proach has resulted in a confused and seemingly inconsistent line of
precedent
4
Much of this confusion is caused by the failure of the Supreme
Court to define the terms of the Just Compensation Clause. The
clause reads, "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation. '5 Of the undefined terms in the clause,
the Court has provided clear tests for only two: "public use"'6 and
"just compensation."7 "Taken" has been given limited, fact-specific
definition.8 "Property," however, has remained largely undefined.
This lack of definition poses a serious problem, because defining the
* I would like to thank Professor William Treanor for his advice and encourage-
ment throughout the preparation of this Note.
1. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
2. A "regulatory taking," as the term is used in this Note, refers to any govern-
mental action that can be considered a taking of property but is neither an explicit
exercise of the eminent domain power nor a physical invasion of property. It covers
actions by the legislature, executive, and, this Note argues, the judiciary. See infra part
IV.B.2.
3. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1529 (1992) (holding that
the effect of a regulation should be analyzed by using "ad hoc, factual inquiries" (cita-
tion omitted)); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 713 (1987) (same); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (same); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (same); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
594 (1962) (same).
4. For example, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987), the Court used the ad hoc, factual approach to uphold a statute virtually
identical to the statute invalidated in Pennsylvania Coal. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 474.
5. U.S. Const. amend. V.
6. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,241 (1984) (-[W]here the ex-
ercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public pur-
pose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public
Use Clause.").
7. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) ("The Court
... has employed the concept of fair market value to determine the condennee's loss.
Under this standard, the owner is entitled to receive 'what a willing buyer would pay
in cash to a willing seller' at the time of the taking." (quoting United States v. Miller,
317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943))).
8. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441(1982) (holding that any "permanent physical occupation of property is a taking").
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terms of the Just Compensation Clause is critical to devising a coher-
ent test for regulatory takings.9
While the general confusion in regulatory takings law has made it
difficult to predict how the Court will decide any particular case, the
Court's precedent in this area is not as incoherent as it initially ap-
pears. Rather, two lines of opinions have developed, each internally
consistent, but in conflict with the other. The first line of opinions can
be characterized as libertarian, focusing on protecting individual prop-
erty owners. The second line can be characterized as utilitarian, ac-
knowledging the importance of property, but subordinating its
protection to the promotion of the common good.'0
In what can be seen as an attempt to solidify the libertarian ap-
proach to takings, the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council" took a step away from the fact-specific inquiries of
previous regulatory takings cases and established a categorical rule. A
regulation is considered to be a per se taking if it renders property
valueless, unless the regulation is of a common law nuisance, or re-
flects background principles of property law. 2 This rule provides a
partial, fact-specific definition of "taken" that clearly supports prop-
erty owners. But the Lucas test, like any rule based on the Just Com-
pensation Clause, requires a definition of "property." Lucas suggests
several definitions of property. 13 These definitions use two sources of
property: the reasonable expectations of property owners and the
state's law of property.
This Note examines the possible definitions of property and the sig-
nificance of a definition to regulatory takings law. Part I compares the
two dominant theoretical justifications of constitutional protection of
property, libertarianism and utilitarianism. Part I then examines the
conflict between the libertarian and utilitarian views of just compensa-
tion as reflected in modem takings law. It concludes that the liberta-
rian approach to just compensation is preferable, and the remainder
of the Note approaches takings from the libertarian perspective.
9. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is
Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1630, 1639 (1988) ("[Sjome definition of
the terms in the Constitution, whether private property or speech, is necessary to
make any sense of the rule of law .... Resolving the taking question, therefore,
requires identifying a legitimate basis for choosing one definition of private property
over another."); see also Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 9-7, at
609 (2d ed. 1988) ("The Court's conception of property in its takings analysis, how-
ever, has often rested too heavily on whether a given stick in a bundle of property
rights resembles the Justices' collective hunch as to what 'traditional' property is all
about."); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1449, 1544 (1990)
(discussing the importance of defining constitutional property to facilitate judicial
review).
10. See infra note 42.
11. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
12. See id. at 2893; see also infra part I.B.
13. See infra part H.D.
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Part II focusses on the Court's opinion in Lucas, discussing the
background of the case, the categorical rule announced by the Court,
and the nuisance exception to the categorical rule, which illustrates
the Court's view of the relationship between government power and
private property rights. Part U then examines the definitions of prop-
erty suggested in Lucas. These definitions suggest that, in the takings
context, property is defined by using either property owners' expecta-
tions or state property law.
Part IIJ discusses the role of property owners' expectations in prop-
erty theory. Part HI concludes that protection of property owners'
expectations is a legitimate goal of property, but that expectations
cannot be used as a source of property.
Because expectations do not provide an adequate definition for
property, this Note uses state law to define property. Part IV dis-
cusses the problems associated with using state law to define property
in the Just Compensation Clause. This part discusses why, due to the
problem of judicial takings, it is necessary to have federal review of
state court property determinations. Part IV concludes by examining
the form such federal review should take.
This Note concludes that in the context of regulatory takings, prop-
erty should be defined by state property law, and that state courts
should have primary responsibility for defining "property." The fed-
eral judiciary, however, must enforce the Just Compensation Clause's
protection of individual liberty. Federal courts must review the legiti-
macy of state court findings on property law to prevent state courts
from abusing the flexibility of common law to write existing property
interests out of existence.
I. INDrviDUAL LIBERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD
In case law and academic writing, there are two dominant theoreti-
cal justifications for the protection of property. 4 Libertarianism justi-
fies the protection of property as essential to maintaining individual
liberty.'5 Utilitarianism justifies the protection of property as essen-
14. Other theories have been developed in academic writing, but have not been
major factors in takings case law. For example, Professor Radin has built on the lib-
eral approach to property to develop a personality theory of takings. In determining
whether legislation acts as a taking, Professor Radin's theory asks two questions:
Is it fair to ask this citizen to bear these costs for the benefit of this commu-
nity? To this pragmatic ethical question the Court should add another.
What conception of human flourishing-of personhood in the context of
community-are we fostering by sustaining or disallowing this legislation?
The latter question is explicitly a mixture of moral and political theory. It
asks us to think not just about fairness to individuals, but also about our
vision of democratic community, and about our understanding of the kind of
community we are always in the process of creating.
Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Ju1-
risprudence of Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1667, 1687 (1988).
15. See infra part I.A.
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tial to the effective and fair functioning of society.' 6 The difference
between the two theories becomes clear when the protection of an
individual's property conflicts with the common good. Libertarianism
will protect individual liberty to the detriment of the common good.
Conversely, utilitarianism will protect the common good at the cost of
individual liberty. This part discusses the libertarian and utilitarian
views of property and examines the conflict between the two views in
modem takings law.
A. Liberty
Republicanism, the dominant political ideology of the Revolution-
ary War period,'7 was characterized by trust in legislatures'8 and sub-
ordination of individual rights to the common good.19 The Fifth
Amendment, written by James Madison, was part of a liberal repudia-
tion of republicanism that was concerned with protecting the individ-
ual against the legislature and the majority it represented.20 The
institution of property, and its protection from government interfer-
ence, was essential to fulfilling the liberals' goal of creating "a large
sphere within which the individual could exercise privileges and enjoy
immunities free from state interference."'"
Applying Madison's liberalism to modem regulatory takings re-
quires more than an appeal to original intent. Madison apparently
intended the Just Compensation Clause to apply only to physical ap-
propriations of property by the federal government,' a fact acknowl-
16. See infra part I.B.
17. William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L.J. 694, 699 (1985).
18. Id. at 700-01.
19. Id at 699.
20. See id. at 704-05. As Professor Thompson has noted:
[V]irtually no one believes that the legislature (or executive branch) decides
when to take property on the basis of a civic republican calculus. Instead,
we believe that property is often taken because of pure majoritarian pres-
sure (or even the pressure of politically powerful minorities). The fifth
amendment stemmed in part from fears that property would otherwise be-
come the target of self-interested majorities (and not merely nonpropertied
majorities) who would use the legislative power to enhance their private col-
lective interests (rather than any altruistic view of the common good)....
The problem, moreover, is not merely one of majoritarian bullying. Recog-
nizing the advantage that the state has in acquiring property for free, politi-
cally powerful individuals and entities will almost certainly lobby the state to
use the takings power to redistribute property in their private favor. A re-
quirement of compensation mutes both opportunities.
Thompson, supra note 9, at 1483-84 (footnotes omitted).
21. Treanor, supra note 17, at 705; see also Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1626 (1988) [hereinafter Michelman, Takings, 1987 ("More-
over, property was their inspiration for the idea of a private sphere of individual self-
determination securely bounded off from politics by law.").
22. Treanor, supra note 17, at 711.
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edged by the modem Court.13 Madison's limited intent, however,
does not mean that the Just Compensation Clause should not be ap-
plied to regulations. Madison intended that the Just Compensation
Clause have a strong moral component that would discourage the gov-
ernment from unfairly imposing the costs of the common good on a
few individuals.'A Whether or not Madison would have intended the
Just Compensation Clause to apply to regulations had he been able to
foresee the modem regulatory state, the moral implication of the
clause is clearly that it is wrong to promote the good of the majority to
the detriment of the minority. As the Court recently noted, "One of
the principle purposes of the Takings Clause is 'to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' "15
The importance of the institution of property, and its constitutional
protection, extends beyond issues of fairness. Professor Charles A.
Reich made the classic modern statement of the libertarian concep-
tion of property:
One of [the functions of property] is to draw a boundary between
public and private power. Property draws a circle around the activi-
ties of each private individual or organization.... Within, [the
owner] is master, and the state must explain and justify any
interference....
Thus, property performs the function of maintaining indepen-
dence, dignity and pluralism in society by creating zones within
which the majority has to yield to the owner. Whim, caprice, irra-
tionality and "antisocial" activities are given the protection of law;,
23. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 n.15 (1992).
24. Treanor, supra note 17, at 712 n.99; see also Frank Michelman, Tutelary Juris-
prudence and Constitutional Property, in Liberty, Property, and the Future of Consti-
tutional Development 127, 135 (Ellen F. Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1990)
[hereinafter Michelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence] ("The historical evidence strongly
confirms that Madison did indeed understand the Fifth Amendment's requirement of
just compensation for property taken to speak for a broadly applicable principle of
anti-redistributive, negative property that popular politics ought ideally to respect.").
25. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. CL 2309, 2316 (1994) (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). Professor Michelman has attributed recent
decisions by the Court protecting property owners to the conservatism of the justices
writing the opinions. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A
Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 Win. & Mary L Rev. 301, 302
(1993) [hereinafter Michelman, Judicial Conservatism]. Professor Michelman is cer-
tainly correct that the justices who have been most protective of property rights are
generally considered to be conservative. See infra note 42. It is also true that in-
creased scrutiny of regulation under the Takings Clause has been an element of "the
conservative ideological agenda." Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on
Lucas, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1411, 1413 (1993); see also W. John Moore, 'Just Compensa-
tion', 24 Nat'l J. 1404-07 (1992) (discussing increased protection given to property
owners by Reagan and Bush appointees to the Federal Circuit and Claims Court).
But the true conflict, as Professor Michelman has acknowledged, is not between con-
flicting political agendas, but between individual rights and the common good.
Michelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence, supra note 24, at 127; Michelman, Takings, 1987,
supra note 21, at 1625.
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the owner may do what all or most of his neighbors decry. The Bill
of Rights also serves this function, but while the Bill of Rights
comes into play only at extraordinary moments of conflict or crisis,
property affords day-to-day protection in the ordinary affairs of life.
Indeed, in the final analysis the Bill of Rights depends upon the
existence of private property. Political rights presuppose that indi-
viduals and private groups have the will and the means to act inde-
pendently. But so long as individuals are motivated largely by self-
interest, their well-being must first be independent. Civil liberties
must have a basis in property, or bills of rights will not preserve
them.
Property is not a natural right but a deliberate construction by
society. If such an institution did not exist, it would be necessary to
create it, in order to have the kind of society we wish. The majority
cannot be expected, on specific issues, to yield its power to a minor-
ity. Only if the minority's will is established as a general principle
can it keep the majority at bay in a given instance. Like the Bill of
Rights, property represents a general, long range protection of indi-
vidual and private interests, created by the majority for the ultimate
good of all.26
Thus, there are two aspects of property's protection of individual lib-
erty. First, property creates a zone within which the individual can act
in ways frowned on by the majority. Second, property assures that
political minorities have the material means to act independently of
political majorities. This second aspect, the maintenance of the mate-
rial independence of political minorities, is protected by the Just Com-
pensation Clause. The Just Compensation Clause does not give
property absolute protection. Rather, the government can take prop-
erty, but if it does, it must pay compensation. 7 The compensation
requirement thus ensures that "individuals and private groups have
the will and the means to act independently" 8 that are essential to
their political freedom.
The essential function of individual rights in a constitutional democ-
racy is to define those areas where the majority is forced to respect the
freedom of the individual, even when to do so is to the detriment of
the common good. This is the purpose of the Fifth Amendment's pro-
26. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale Li. 733, 771-72 (1964).
27. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
315 (1987) ("This basic understanding of the Amendment makes clear that it is
designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but
rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amount-
ing to a taking."). In Professor Epstein's words:
The scope of the clause is as broad as the manifold types of takings that
human ingenuity can devise. Yet in every case the takings clause recognizes
that the claims of individual autonomy must be tempered by the frictions
that pervade everyday life.... Autonomy must be protected by supplying an
equivalent for what is lost, but it is not protected absolutely.
Richard A. Epstein, Takings ix (1985).
28. Reich, supra note 26, at 771.
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tection of private property. The libertarian position, then, requires
courts to interpret the Just Compensation Clause in a manner that
maximizes individual liberty, even at the expense of the common
good.
B. Utility
To utilitarians, property should be protected because of its impor-
tance in the effective functioning of capitalist society. Utilitarians
base this conception of property on the idea that people will not "la-
bor diligently or invest freely unless they know they can depend on
rules which assure them that they will indeed be permitted to enjoy a
substantial share of the product as the price of their labor or their risk
of savings."2 9 Government interference with private property is dis-
couraged because of its negative effect on private labor and
investment.30
The primary goal pursued by utilitarians is the maximization of util-
ity, not of individuals, but of society as a whole.31 This goal is re-
flected in the classic utilitarian test for compensability set forth by
Professor Frank I. Michelman.32 Professor Michelman's test for com-
pensability has three elements. First, positive "'[e]fficiency gains'
[are] the excess of benefits produced by a [government action] over
losses inflicted by it."' 33 Second, negative "demoralization costs" take
29. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1212 (1967) [herein-
after Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness]. In Bentham's words:
Law does not say to man, Labour, and I will reward you" but it says: Labour,
and I will assure to you the enjoyment of the fruits of your labour-that natu-
ral and sufficient recompense which without me you cannot preserve; I will
insure it by arresting the hand which may seek to ravish it from you. If indus-
try creates, it is law which preserves; if at the fast moment we owe all to
labour, at the second moment, and at every other, we are indebted for every-
thing to law.
Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation bk. II, pt. L ch. VIL at 110 (Harcourt,
Brace 1931).
30. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. CL 2886, 2903 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Takings Clause... protects private expectations to
ensure private investment."); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Com-
ment on Michelman, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1697, 1701-02 (1988) ("The clause is an at-
tempt to reconcile an unpredictable, democratically responsible polity with the
existence of a capitalist economy based on private property and individual
initiative.").
31. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 29, at 1213.
32. Id at 1214-15. Professor Miechelman's position of takings in Property, Utility,
and Fairness is not purely utilitarian. As the title indicates, his position combines
utilitarian efficiency with Rawsian ideas of fairness. Id at 1218-24. In a more recent
article, Professor Michelman has contrasted libertarianism with republicanism, per-
haps indicating a shift away from utilitarian thinking. See Michelman, Tutelary Juris-
prudence, supra note 24.
33. Mchelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 29, at 1214.
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into account the effect a transaction will have on the affected individu-
als and society generally:
"Demoralization costs" are defined as the total of (1) the dollar
value necessary to offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their
sympathizers specifically from the realization that no compensation
is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost future
production (reflecting either impaired incentives or social unrest)
caused by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathiz-
ers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that they them-
selves ma be subjected to similar treatment on some other
occasion. y
Third, "settlement costs" are the costs of compensation needed to
make the affected property owner wholeA5 If the positive efficiency
gains of a government action are less than both demoralization and
settlement costs, then the government action is improper because it
results in a net loss of utility.36 In other circumstances, the govern-
ment should only pay compensation when "demoralization costs ex-
ceed settlement [compensation] CoStS." '37 Thus, the utilitarian test
does not simply weigh the benefit of a regulation against its immediate
cost;38 it also takes into account the effect denying compensation
would have on society as a whole.3 9 But the test emphasizes maximiz-
ing the common good, and if it is less expensive for the government
not to compensate than it is to compensate, then no compensation is
due.
C. The Conflict Between Liberty and Utility in Takings Law
The conflict between liberty and utility has played itself out in mod-
em takings law. Ever since Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,4 ° which
established that a regulation could constitute a taking of private prop-
erty,41 justices protecting property owners have emphasized liberty,
while those rejecting takings claims have emphasized the common
34. Idt (footnote omitted).
35. Id.
36. It. at 1215.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. As Hume noted:
A single act of justice is frequently contrary to public interest; and were it to
stand alone, without being followed by other acts, may, in itself, be very
prejudicial to soiety ... . Though in one instance the public be a sufferer,
this momentary ill is amply compensated by the steady prosecution of the
rule, and by the peace and order which it establishes in society.
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature bk. III, pt. II, § II, at 448 (Dolphin Books
1961).
40. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
41. I& at 415.
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good.42 This dichotomy reflects a problem that has plagued American
political thought ever since Madison and other liberals broke with re-
publicanism: How do we balance democracy with individual rights,
the common good with individual liberty?
Utilitarianism and libertarianism will, in many circumstances, con-
verge in their requirement of compensation. But in those situations
where compensation is not necessary to maximize the common good,
utilitarianism and libertarianism diverge. Utilitarianism will take the
view that the common good should take precedence over individual
liberty and that compensation should not be paid. Libertarianism will
emphasize individual liberty over the common good and require com-
pensation. This Note takes the position that the Just Compensation
Clause, like other constitutional rights, is intended to define an area
where the majority must respect the freedom of the individual. There-
fore, this Note approaches the problem of defining property from the
perspective that "property" in the Just Compensation Clause should
be defined in a way that maximizes individual liberty, even at the ex-
pense of the common good.
II. LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,4 3 decided in 1992, is the
Supreme Court's most recent regulatory takings decision. This part
42. In most regulatory takings cases, both the libertarian and utilitarian viewpoints
are represented, one in the opinion of the Court, the other in dissent. Compare Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. CL 2886, 2895 (1992) (Scalia, J.) (holding
that the purpose of creating the categorical rule is to prevent private property from
"being pressed into ... public service under the guise of mitigating serious public
harm"); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321
(1987) (Rehnquist, CJ.) ("[Miany of the provisions of the Constitution are designed
to limit the flexibility and freedom of governmental authorities, and the Just Compen-
sation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of them."); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,516 (1987) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (arguing
that whether a taking has occurred should be determined by looking at "the property
holder's loss rather than the government's gain"); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 147-48 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Just Compensation Clause is directed at preventing individuals from bearing the costs
of the common good) and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)
(Holmes, J.) ("We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut
than the constitutional way of paying for the change.") with Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2905
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he State has the power to prevent any use of property
it finds to be harmful to its citizens."); First English, 482 U.S. at 325 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that no compensation is due if regulation "protect[s] the health
and safety of the community"); Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 (Stevens, J.) ("Under our
system of government, one of the State's primary ways of preserving the public weal is
restricting the uses individuals can make of their property."); Penn Central, 438 U.S.
at 125 (Brennan, J.) (allowing the destruction of property interests if it promotes the
general welfare) and Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("The State merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with para-
mount rights of the public.").
43. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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begins by examining the background of the case and the categorical
rule for regulatory takings the Court established in Lucas. It then ex-
amines the nuisance exception to regulatory takings and its relation-
ship to the police power. This part concludes by discussing the
possible definitions of property suggested in the opinion of the Court
and Justice Kennedy's concurrence.
A. Background
In 1986, David Lucas bought two residential lots on the South Caro-
lina coast for $975,000, intending to build single-family homes on
them." TWo years later, South Carolina enacted the Beachfront Man-
agement Act45 (the "Act"), which barred Lucas from "erecting any
permanent habitable structures on his two parcels. '46 Lucas chal-
lenged the Act, claiming that it "effected a taking of his property with-
out just compensation." 47 The trial court found that there were no
restrictions on building single-family residences at the time Lucas
bought the property, and that the Act "deprive[d] Lucas of any rea-
sonable economic use of the lots,... eliminated the unrestricted right
of use, and render[ed] them valueless."'48 The trial court held that the
Act therefore effected a taking of Lucas's property and ordered South
Carolina to pay Lucas $1,232,387.50 in just compensation.49
The South Carolina Supreme Court found that the legislature in-
tended the Act to prevent the deterioration of the South Carolina
coastline, an important natural resource.50 The South Carolina
Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court decision,51 reasoning
that the Act was intended to prevent serious public harm and holding
that harm-preventing land use regulation is never a taking.s2
B. The Categorical Rule
Prior to Lucas, the Court did not use any specific test in regulatory
takings cases. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,53 Justice Holmes
made the oft-quoted assertion that "if [a] regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking." 4 Declining to specify when a regulation
goes too far, subsequent decisions by the Court generally approached
44. Id. at 2889.
45. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 48-39-10 to 360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
46. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
47. Id. at 2890.
48. Id. (alteration in original).
49. Id.
50. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898 (S.C. 1991).
51. Ia at 902.
52. Id at 899.
53. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
54. Id. at 415.
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regulatory takings using "ad hoc, factual inquiries""55 based on the cir-
cumstances of the individual case. The language of some cases, how-
ever, suggests that such ad hoc, factual inquiries would not apply if the
regulation destroyed all value of a property.56
Building on this language, the Lucas Court reversed the South Car-
olina Supreme Court and set up a categorical rule for regulatory tak-
ings: A regulation would be found to go "too far" and violate the
Fifth Amendment if it "denie[d] all economically beneficial or produc-
tive use of land."57 The Court provided two justifications for the cate-
gorical rule. First, a total deprivation is the equivalent of physical
appropriation.58 Second, a total deprivation carries with it a "height-
ened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of
public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.
59
The Court suggested that while it used the word "all," the destruction
of most of the value of a property interest would be sufficient to re-
quire the finding of a taking under the categorical rule.60
C. The Nuisance Exception and Exercises of the Police Power
The South Carolina Supreme Court, citing a long line of takings
cases, asserted that "a taking has not been found when the regulation
exists to prevent serious public harm. ' 61 Writing for the United States
Supreme Court, Justice Scalia agreed that "[i]t is correct that many of
our prior opinions have suggested that 'harmful or noxious uses' of
property may be proscribed by government regulation without the re-
55. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see cases
cited supra note 3.
56. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("The application
of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance ...
denies an owner economically viable use of his land .... ." (citations omitted)).
57. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992) (citing
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470,495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface fining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264,295-96 (1981)). Another formulation of the rule is "when the owner of real
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name
of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a
taking." Id. at 2895.
58. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
59. Id at 2895.
60. See id. at 2894 n.7. "It is only logical, then, that government action other than
acquisition of title, occupancy, or physical invasion can be a 'taking,' and therefore a
de facto exercise of the power of eminent domain, where the effects completely de-
prive the owner of all or most of his interest in the property." San Diego Gas, 450 U.S.
at 653 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v.
United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1178, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (affirming finding of a total
taking for a 99% reduction in value).
61. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 899 (1991) (citing
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
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quirement of compensation." 6 The Court held, however, that the
"harmful use" language merely established that there were some types
of regulations that could be considered exercises of police power and
would not require compensation.63 Therefore, the Court concluded
that the "harmful use" language could not serve as the analytical basis
for deciding which regulations were non-compensable exercises of po-
lice power and which were compensable takings.64
Rejecting the "harmful or noxious use" terminology of earlier cases,
the Court focused on the nature of the property owner's interest to
distinguish between police power regulations and regulatory takings:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation
only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the
owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part
of his title to begin with. This accords, we think, with our "takings"jurisprudence, which has traditionally been guided by the under-
standings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the State's
power over, the "bundle of rights" that they acquire when they ob-
tain title to property. 65
Using this reasoning, the term "police power regulation" refers to a
regulation that does not interfere with the property owner's "bundle
of rights," because the power to regulate the activity in question is
reserved in the state.66 Thus, when a state regulates a nuisance, the
property owner's bundle of rights does not include the right to engage
in the prohibited activity; no compensation is due because nothing is
taken from the property owner.
Based on this inquiry into the nature of the owner's property rights,
Justice Scalia formulated a common-sense exception to the categorical
rule that a regulation that renders a property interest valueless re-
quires compensation. If the right to engage in the prohibited activity
is not possessed by the property owner, but is instead reserved in the
state, no compensation is due. In Justice Scalia's words: "Any limita-
tion so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compen-
sation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance al-
62. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897 (1992).
63. IL at 2898-99 (" '[P]revention of harmful use' was merely our early formula-
tion of the police power justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) any
regulatory diminution in value ... .
64. Id at 2899.
65. Ia (footnote omitted).
66. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("As long rec-
ognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the
police power."); see also Epstein, supra note 27, at 107 (defining the police power as
"those grants of power to the federal and state government that survive the explicit
limitations found in the Constitution").
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ready place upon land ownership."'67 The ability of a state to regulate
a nuisance is thus based on the idea that the property owner does not
have a right to engage in a nuisance. A regulation prohibiting a nui-
sance takes nothing from the property owner and is a legitimate exer-
cise of the police power.'
D. The Definitions of "Property" in Lucas
To determine whether property has been rendered valueless, one
must define property. Discussing the nuisance exception, the Court
suggested that the source of this definition is "in the... background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance."69 The Court
also suggested a somewhat broader definition:
The answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's rea-
sonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of prop-
erty-ie., whether and to what degree the State's law has accorded
legal recognition and protection to the particular interest in land
67. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900. Such restrictions, of course, could derive from areas
of law other than nuisance. For example, the limitation could derive from the doc-
trines of public necessity, id. at 2900 n.16, or public trust. See James N. Kehoe, Note,
The Next Wave in Public Beach Access: Removal of States as Trustees of Public Trust
Properties, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1913, 1928 (1995) (arguing that the public trust doc-
trine reserves certain rights to beachfront property in the state, preventing a property
owner from raising a takings claim challenging government regulations requiring pub-
lic access to beaches).
68. The nuisance exception itself is based on a conception of nuisance that may be
becoming outdated. See Kmiec, supra note 9, at 1638 n.50. One of the justifications
for the nuisance exception is that a law preventing a nuisance merely "duplicate[s] the
result that could have been achieved... by adjacent landowners ... under the State's
law of private nuisance, or by the State under [its public nuisance power]." Lucas,
112 S. Ct. at 2900. Thus, a law preventing a nuisance provides the same result as a
private nuisance suit resulting in an injunction.
Some modern nuisance cases, however, based on the idea of liability rules, have
resulted in compensation, rather than injunctions. The classic examples of liability
rules being used in nuisance cases are Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d
870, 875 (N.Y. 1970) (granting plaintiff's request for an injunction, but allowing de-
fendant to void the injunction by paying damages), and Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E.
Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972) (In Banc) (granting plaintiff's
request for an injunction, but requiring the plaintiff to pay defendant compensation
for losses resulting from the injunction). On the distinction between property rules
and liability rules generally, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L Rev.
1089, 1092 (1972) (explaining that an entitlement protected by a liability rule can be
destroyed by anyone willing to pay compensation to the owner of the entitlement,
while an entitlement protected by a property rule can be removed only by a voluntary
transaction with the owner).
Therefore, if liability rules are used, compensation must be paid if a nuisance-
preventing law is to put the state in the same position as a neighboring private land-
owner. If "property" in the Just Compensation Clause is defined using state law, see
infra part IV, the implication of this modern view of nuisance is that in a state where
liability rules are used, the state may have to pay compensation when it regulates a
nuisance.
69. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900; see supra note 67.
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with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in
(or elimination of) value.7 0
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy suggested an even broader
definition:
In my view, reasonable expectations must be understood in light of
the whole of our legal tradition. The common law of nuisance is too
narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex
and interdependent society. The State should not be prevented
from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing
conditions, and courts must consider all reasonable expectations
whatever their source. The Takings Clause does not require a static
body of state property law; it protects private expectations to ensure
private investment. I agree with the Court that nuisance prevention
accords with the most common expectations of property owners
who face regulation, but I do not believe this can be the sole source
of state authority to impose severe restrictions. Coastal property
may present such unique concerns for a fragile land system that the
State can go further in regulating its development and use than the
common law of nuisance might otherwise permit.71
Thus, between the opinion of the Court and Justice Kennedy's concur-
ring opinion, there are three possible definitions of property, as the
term relates to regulatory takings: (1) Property is defined by the
background principles of the state's property and nuisance law; (2)
Property is defined as the property owner's reasonable expectations as
shaped by the state's law of property; and (3) Property is defined as
the property owner's reasonable expectations, no matter what their
source.
Following the libertarian approach to takings, the question of
which, if any, of the Lucas definitions of property is suitable to regula-
tory takings hinges on which of the definitions best promotes the pro-
tection of individual liberty. To determine this, an inquiry must be
made into the definitions' component parts: property owner's expec-
tations and the state's law of property.
Ill. EXPECTATION AS PROPERTY
Lucas suggests that property owner's expectations may define prop-
erty in the Just Compensation Clause. This part discusses the impor-
tance of protecting individual expectations as a justification of
property, then examines the suitability of expectation as a source of
property in the Just Compensation Clause.
70. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
71. Id at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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A. Expectation as a Justification for Property
In Johnson v. M'Intosh,7 decided in 1823, the Supreme Court re-
ferred to the idea of expectation in legitimizing American colonial ti-
tles. Justifying title by conquest, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of
an inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has
been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a
country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the
great mass of the community originated in it, it becomes the law of
the land, and cannot be questioned.... However this restriction
may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized na-
tions, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which the
country has been settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of
the two people, it may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and cer-
tainly cannot be rejected by Courts of justice.m 3
In this passage, Chief Justice Marshall can be understood to be ad-
dressing the "compelling role that settled expectations play in any
non-anarchic society and the importance of ensuring some degree of
certainty in whatever system a society adopts."74
Similarly, the protection of property owner's expectations is a cen-
tral goal of utilitarian property theory, which justifies property as nec-
essary to the orderly and effective functioning of society.75 Hume
argued that property evolved because protecting individuals' security
of possession is an essential component in the development of soci-
ety.76 An individual will respect another's property because the bene-
fits of society outweigh the benefits of interfering with that person's
property.' Therefore, property "is a conventionally recognized sta-
bility of possession, the convention evolving out of selfish perceptions
of the advantage in association."78 The result is that "property be-
comes 'a basis of expectations' founded on existing rules... the insti-
72. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
73. Id, at 591-92.
74. Kevin J. Worthen, Sword or Shield: The Past and Future Impact of Western
Legal Thought on American Indian Sovereignty, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1372, 1382 (1991)
(reviewing Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal Thought
(1990)).
75. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
76. Hume, supra note 39 bk. III, pt. II, § II, at 441-43; see Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness, supra note 29, at 1209-10.
77. Hume, supra note 39 bk. III, pt. II, § Ii, at 442 ("Nor is the rule concerning the
stability of possessions the less derived from human conventions, that it arises gradu-
ally, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the
inconveniences of transgressing it." (emphasis added)).
78. Michelman, Property Utility, and Fairness, supra note 29, at 1210; see also
Richard A Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 Loy. LA. L. Rev. 955, 976 (1993) ("Permanence,
stability and certainty are all regarded as virtues of a system of property rights. In-
deed, David Hume, in offering his justification for the institution of property, spoke of
the need for the stability of possession as one of its central features.").
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tutionally established understanding that extant rules governing the
relationships among men with respect to resources will continue in
existence."79 Thus, property rights are justified by the expectations
that result from them.
B. Are Expectations an Appropriate Source of Property in Takings
Law?
Of the three definitions of property used in Lucas, two focus on
expectations. One definition used by the Court defined property as
the property owner's reasonable expectations as shaped by the state's
law of property.8" Justice Kennedy defined property as the property
owner's reasonable expectations, no matter what their source,' In
these definitions, expectations are the source of property, as well as
the result of property as described by Hume and Chief Justice Mar-
shall. If expectations are the source of property rights, then the gov-
ernment will enforce the expectations of property owners. But
property owners' expectations will in turn be shaped by those rights
that the government enforces. The result is that expectation loses any
definitional significance. As Justice Kennedy noted, "There is an in-
herent tendency towards circularity in this synthesis ...for if the
owner's reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts allow as a
proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become
what courts say it is." 8 Defining "property" in the Just Compensation
Clause is necessary to avoid the confusion that has characterized mod-
em takings law. 83 Because defining property as expectation amounts
to not defining property at all, expectation is not suitable as a source
of property in the Just Compensation Clause.
IV. DEFINING PROPERTY USING THE STATE'S PROPERTY LAW
Eliminating those definitions of property suggested in Lucas that
are based on property owner's expectations leaves state law as a possi-
ble definition of property. This part begins by discussing a problem
raised when a diminution in value test such as the Lucas categorical
rule is used to evaluate the constitutionality of a government action:
79. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 29, at 1211-12.
It is hence that we have the power of forming a general plan of conduct; it is
hence that the successive instants which compose the duration of life are not
like isolated and independent points, but become continuous parts of a
whole. Expectation is a chain which unites our present existence to our fu-
ture existence ....
Bentham, supra note 29 bk. II, pt. I, ch. VII, at 111.
80. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992); see
supra note 70 and accompanying text.
81. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
82. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
83. Supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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What is the property interest that the reduction in value caused by the
government action is measured against? The Lucas rule requires
compensation when a government action reduces the value of prop-
erty to zero.' The categorical rule will more likely be invoked if the
government action's effect is measured against the discrete property
interest affected by the action, rather than against the property
owner's entire estate. This part concludes that the effect of the gov-
ernment action should be measured against the discrete interest af-
fected by the action. Thus, the Lucas categorical rule is invoked if a
government action renders any property interest defined by state law
valueless.
This part then examines the sources of state property law and the
ability of each branch of government to change the law. The ability to
change property law allows a branch of government to avoid paying
just compensation by eliminating those property rights affected by a
government action. Considering the anti-legislative origins of the Just
Compensation Clause, it is clear that the legislature cannot change
property law without compensation. A more difficult issue is whether
the judicial changes in property law are compensable. Even if judicial
actions can be considered takings, the indeterminacy inherent in com-
mon law makes it difficult to tell whether a state court is legitimately
interpreting precedent or is reading a property right out of existence
to avoid compensation. This part concludes that to protect individual
liberty, state court property determinations should be subject to fed-
eral takings scrutiny.
This part then examines what form this federal review should take.
Because federalism concerns preclude establishing a federal property
law, this part concludes that the Court should review state court prop-
erty determinations to ensure that they define property using legiti-
mate statutory and common law precedent rather than abuse the
inherent flexibility of common law to define property rights out of
existence.
A. The Reduction in Value Should Be Measured Against the
Discrete Interest Affected by the Government Action
Under the Lucas per se rule, a government action that renders
property valueless is a taking.8s This result raises another question:
When measuring the reduction in value caused by a government ac-
tion, what is the property interest that goes into the denominator of
the equation?s6 Two simple examples illustrate the problem.
84. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
86. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7 (noting that "the rhetorical force of our 'dep-
rivation of all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the
rule does not make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be
measured"); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir.
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First, consider a 100 acre parcel of land valued at $100,000. All of
the acres are identical, and each is worth $1,000. A land use regula-
tion renders 50 of the 100 acres valueless. The reduction in value
caused by the regulation is calculated by dividing the loss in value by
the original value of the parcel. The result of this calculation clearly
depends on what value is used as the denominator of the equation-
the entire 100 acre parcel or the 50 acres affected by the regulation. If
one uses the entire 100 acres, the result is a 50% reduction in value. If
one uses the 50 acres affected by the regulation, the reduction in value
would be 100%. Thus, if the 50 acres are used as the denominator, the
Lucas categorical rule is invoked, and the regulation is a per se taking.
If the 100 acres are used as the denominator, the regulation would not
be a per se taking.
Second, consider a building in New York City. The entire fee sim-
ple is worth $10,000,000. The air rights above the building are worth
$1,000,000. The city enacts a zoning regulation that abolishes air
rights. If the reduction in value is based on the entire fee simple, the
regulation results in a 10% reduction in value. If the reduction in
value is based on the air rights, there is a 100% reduction in value, and
the regulation is a per se taking under Lucas.
Thus, application of the Lucas categorical rule depends on what
piece of the property owner's estate is used as the denominator in the
reduction of value equation. The process of using only the property
interest affected by the regulation is called "conceptual severance," a
term that originated in an article by Professor Margaret Jane Radin. 7
As Professor Radin defines the term, "conceptual severance"
consists of delineating a property interest consisting of just what the
government action has removed from the owner, and then asserting
that that particular whole thing has been permanently taken. Thus,
this strategy hypothetically or conceptually "severs" from the whole
bundle of rights just those strands that are interfered with by the
regulation, and then hypothetically or conceptually construes those
strands in the aggregate as a separate whole thing.88
Conceptual severance has a checkered history of acceptance by the
Supreme Court. Not surprisingly, those justices attempting to protect
individual property owners have accepted conceptual severance, while
those who emphasize the effect land use regulation has on the com-
mon good have rejected it.89
1994) (discussing the "Denominator Problem"); Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness, supra note 29, at 1192 (noting that "[t]he difficulty [of measuring a diminu-
tion in value] is aggravated when the question is raised of how to define the 'particu-
lar thing' whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction").
87. Radin, supra note 14.
88. Id. at 1676.
89. Thus, those justices who use liberty-oriented language support conceptual sev-
erance, while those who use common good/utilitarian language oppose conceptual
severance. See supra note 42. Compare First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
1870 [Vol. 63
1995] DEFINING "PROPERTY" 1871
Because the property interest in question in Lucas was the entire
fee simple, the Court left the denominator problem unanswered.90
The opinion, however, contains language supportive of conceptual
severance. In Andrus v. Allard,91 a case dealing with personal prop-
erty,92 the Court held that "the denial of one traditional property right
does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner pos-
sesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand'
of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in
its entirety."'93 In Lucas, Justice Scalia was able to follow up on his
concurrence in Hodel v. Irving' and implicitly limit Allard to personal
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 319 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.) (conceptually sev-
ering a temporary regulation into a taking of a term of years); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 517 (1987) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting)
("There is no question that this coal is an identifiable and separable property inter-
est."); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 142 (1978) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court has frequently emphasized that the term 'property'
as used in the Taking Clause includes the entire 'group of rights inhering in the citi-
zen's [ownership]." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)) and Pennsylvania Coal
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,414 (1922) (Holmes, J.) ("[The regulation] purports to abolish
what is recognized ... as an estate in land ... .") with First English, 482 U.S. at 335
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (objecting to the finding of a temporary taking); Keystone, 480
U.S. at 498 (Stevens, J.) ("The 27 million tons of coal do not constitute a separate
segment of property for takings law purposes."); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130 (Bren-
nan, J.) ("'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete seg-
ments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated.") and Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 419 (Brandeis, J. dissenting)
("The rights of an owner as against the public are not increased by dividing the inter-
ests in his property into surface and subsoil.").
90. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2894 n.7 (1992). Jus-
tice Scalia wrote:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically fea-
sible use" rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear
the "property interest" against which the loss of value is to be measured.
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural
tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation
as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial
use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has
suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.... Unsurpris-
ingly, this uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator in our
"deprivation" fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the
Court.... In any event, we avoid this difficulty in the present case, since the
"interest in land" that Lucas has pleaded (a fee simple interest) is an estate
with a rich tradition of protection at common law, and since the South Caro-
lina Court of Common Pleas found that the Beachfront Management Act
left each of Lucas's beachfront lots without economic value.
Id.
91. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
92. Allard involved a regulatory takings challenge by dealers of Native American
artifacts to federal regulations that prohibited the sale of certain bird feathers. Id. at
53-55.
93. ld. at 65-66.
94. 481 U.S. 704, 719 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[in finding a taking today
our decision effectively limits Allard to its facts.").
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property.9 5 Thus, while the Lucas Court has left the issue open, it is
implicitly supportive of conceptual severance.
The Just Compensation Clause protects individual freedom by com-
pensating the individual for costs incurred by a government action
that promotes the common good.96 Maintaining the individual's ma-
terial autonomy requires compensation even where the government
action does not take all of a property owner's estate.97 A rule that
permits government action to take fifty percent of a property owner's
estate without compensation infringes on individual freedom by re-
quiring the individual to bear the cost of the common good.98 Such a
rule also raises the possibility that the government, by successive tak-
ings of half of the individual's property, could reduce the individual's
estate to essentially nothing. The libertarian approach to takings,
therefore, requires the application of conceptual severance. Thus,
from the libertarian perspective, the Lucas categorical rule requires
compensation whenever a government action renders any property in-
terest in the individual's estate valueless.99 Using state law as the
source of property, the libertarian approach to the Just Compensation
Clause thus requires compensation for any government action that
renders valueless any property interest that is defined by state law.100
95. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899-2900 (1992)
(giving Allard as an example of how personal property is given less protection than is
real property). Property protects individual liberty by creating a zone of individual
autonomy and by maintaining individual material independence. See supra note 27
and accompanying text. Giving greater protection to real property than to personal
property is justified from the perspective of creating a zone of individual autonomy.
But because personal property can be as important to an individual's material inde-
pendence as real property, giving less protection to personal property is not justified
by the libertarian approach to takings.
96. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
98. See supra text accompanying note 25.
99. The libertarian approach to takings would require compensation for a govern-
ment action that results in any diminution in value of a property interest, but fell short
of rendering that interest valueless. See Epstein, supra note 27, at 62. To facilitate the
discussion of defining property, the scope of this Note is limited to those situations
where a government action destroys all value of a given property interest, however
defined, and does not consider those government actions that only reduce the value of
that property interest. Professor Epstein uses the term "partial takings" to refer to
both those government actions that take all of a property interest, but not the owner's
entire estate, and those that reduce the value of a property interest, but do not render
the property interest valueless. Id. at 57-62. But, in light of the Lucas categorical rule,
the term "partial takings" is misleading when referring to those government actions
that render a property interest, less than the owner's entire estate, valueless. Rather,
such a government action is more accurately described as a total taking of a partial
estate.
100. The property owner, of course, must own the particular interest in question, as
the investment-backed expectations requirement indicates. The investment-backed
expectations requirement was first introduced as a factor in takings law in Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). In a post-Lucas
decision, the Federal Circuit noted that the purpose of the investment-backed expec-
tation requirement is to "limit[ ] takings recoveries to owners who [can] demonstrate
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B. Who Defines State Property Law?
At first blush, the question of whether a property owner has a
vested property interest seems simple. If the state's statutory and
common law say a person has a property interest, then that person has
that property interest. The question, unfortunately, leads to another,
more difficult question: Who defines state law?
1. Legislature or Judiciary?
In Lucas, the Court was clear that it would not allow the legislature
to determine that a property owner does not have a particular prop-
erty interest.1 1 For example, the legislature cannot assert that a prop-
erty owner does not have an interest to engage in an activity by
labeling the activity a nuisance. In dissent, Justice Blackmun asserted
that the legislature could make this determination. 02 The Court re-
jected this view, recognizing that, unless the legislature had "a stupid
staff,"'1 3 the legislature would simply label any prohibited activity a
nuisance to avoid paying compensation. 10 Considering the Fifth
Amendment's anti-majoritarian and anti-legislative'05 origins, it is
clear that "the Takings Clause requires courts to do more than insist
upon artful harm-preventing characterizations [by the legislature]."'0 6
The Lucas Court's reliance on the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and "common law principles"'0 7 implies that the Court would allow
that they bought their property in reliance on a state of affairs that did not include the
challenged regulatory regime." Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F3d
1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994). For example, suppose that a regulation prohibits the
filling of wetlands. P1, who owned property affected by the regulation before the
regulation took effect, may have a taking claim against the government. Whether
compensation will be paid or not, the regulation can be seen as taking the right to fill
the wetlands from P1 and reserving the right to prohibit the filling of wetlands in the
state. If P2 later bought the property from P1, the bundle of rights purchased by P2
would not include the right that allows the filling of wetlands, and P2 would not have
a taking claim against the government. The price P2 paid for the property should
reflect the effect of the regulation, and the regulation would not interfere with P2's
investment-backed expectations. Thus, the investment-backed expectations test asks
whether the property interests affected by the regulation were held by the property
owner or reserved in the state-the same inquiry suggested by the nuisance exception
to the Lucas categorical rule. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
101. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2898 n.12 (1992).
102. Id. at 2906 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun based this assertion
on a more expansive view of the nuisance exception than that adopted by the Court.
Id.; see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
103. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2898 n.12.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
106. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2898 n.12; see Kmiec, supra note 9, at 1640 ("[A] concept
of property that is entirely malleable by the legislature is not compatible with the
constitutional design. Were private property subject to unlimited legislative redefini-
tion, any distinction between harm and benefit would be meaningless and the individ-
ual surrendered to the whim of the majority.").
107. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
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state courts to determine whether a particular interest is protected by
state property law. In light of its hostility to legislative definition of
property rights, the Court apparently assumed that the judiciary
would be better than the legislature at protecting individual property
rights from majoritarian pressure, an assumption that has a highly
questionable basis.
2. The Problem of Judicial Takings
The ability of courts to change common law raises serious questions
as to whether courts should be allowed to define "property" in the
Just Compensation Clause. In his article Judicial Takings,10 8 Professor
Barton Thompson gave an example that illustrates the problem:
Under the traditional common law rule, owners of beachfront prop-
erty hold title down to the mean high tide line. If the executive or
legislative branch of a state government were to order private
beachfront owners to permit the public onto the portion of their
beaches between the mean high tide line and the vegetation line,
without compensation, the United States Supreme Court would al-
most certainly hold that the state had taken the beachowners' prop-
erty in violation of the Constitution. If, on the other hand, a state
court were to reject the traditional common law rule, overrule its
prior decisions, and hold that private owners exercise dominion
only to the vegetation line, this might not be considered an uncon-
stitutional taking. The immediate consequence to the beachowners,
however, is identical: in both cases, they have lost the exclusive
right to a portion of what they justifiably had thought was their
beach. 1' 9
As Professor Thompson noted, courts and scholars traditionally have
declined to consider judicial actions takings, arguing that "judicial de-
cisions do not suffer from the same political excesses as statutes and
administrative regulations." 110 If this argument is correct, then a ma-
jor goal of the Just Compensation Clause-protecting the individual
from majority-influenced legislative and administrative actions-
would be met by allowing state judiciaries to determine questions of
property law. But, in fact, courts have both the motivation and the
means to act in the same way as the legislature or executive."'
Because the courts are not free from political influence, 1 2 they
have the motivation to promote the common good at the expense of
108. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1449 (1990).
109. Id at 1450 (footnotes omitted).
110. Id at 1484.
111. See id at 1451 ("Courts have the doctrinal tools to undertake many of the
actions that legislatures and executive agencies are constitutionally barred from pur-
suing under the takings protections-and pressure is mounting for courts to use those
tools.").
112. See id. at 1541 ("[W]hile the legislative, administrative, and judicial processes
are different, they suffer in varying degrees from many of the same political
imperfections.").
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the individual property owner. At times, state courts have even acted
as surrogates for the legislature. Professor Thompson cites a number
of examples" 3 of courts finding that a property owner did not possess
the relevant interest "only after the legislature passed or proposed
legislation clearly pointing out the direction it wished the court to
take.""' 4 Because the desired change in the law was made by the judi-
ciary, rather than by the legislature, the government successfully
avoided the Fifth Amendment's compensation requirement." 5
The uncertainty inherent in common law" 6 gives courts the means
to impose the cost of the common good on the individual. In Profes-
sor Thompson's beachfront example, the court achieved the same re-
sult as the legislature by redefining the beachfront owners' property
interest."7 Thus, if judicial actions are to be subject to Fifth Amend-
ment review, the reviewing court must determine whether the lower
court is making a good faith effort to interpret the common law or is
"paying lip service to stare decisis" ''  and changing previously estab-
lished property rights."19 To maintain the Just Compensation Clause's
protection of individual liberty, judicial actions must be given the
same scrutiny that is given to the actions of other government
branches.
For most of this century, the Court has endorsed this type of judicial
review in the area of legislative takings.120 Ever since Muhlker v. New
York & Harlem Railroad,12 ' the Court has held that it can review a
113. Ide at 1487-88 n.157.
114. Id at 1487.
115. Id. at 1507. "As [an] example, the California government has frequently relied
on the public trust doctrine to attempt to establish public rights to beaches and other
resources for which they might otherwise have had to pay compensation." Id at 1507-
08. But see Kehoe, supra note 67, at 1926-34 (arguing that such reliance on the public
trust doctrine does not violate the Just Compensation Clause).
116. Professor Thompson notes three types of legal indeterminacy that make inter-
pretation of common law property difficult: (1) "constructing the holding of a prior
case," (2) multiple, inconsistent, lines of precedent, and (3) "dual commitment to spe-
cific substantive precedents and to broader decisional principles." Thompson, supra
note 108, at 1532-34.
117. Supra note 109 and accompanying text.
118. Thompson, supra note 108, at 1451.
119. See it. at 1523 ("Given the indeterminacy of positive law, moreover, will we
ever be able to say definitively that a court has changed the law?").
120. A "legislative taking" is a legislative action that violates the Just Compensa-
tion Clause.
121. 197 U.S. 544 (1905). Professor Thompson described the background and
lower court holding of Muhlker as follows:
[Tihe Court had its first brush with the issue of judicial takings when it be-
came involved in the then-famous "elevated railway" cases. At the end of
the nineteenth century, New York and a number of other eastern cities
rushed to construct elevated railways in an attempt to ease traffic conges-
tion. Not surprisingly, the owners of property adjacent to the elevated rail-
ways objected vociferously to the darkness, noise, smoke, dirt, and cinders
associated with the railways. Initially, the New York state courts sided with
the adjacent property holders and repeatedly held that they must be com-
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state court's determination of property rights "where a property
holder challenge[s] a legislative or executive action as a taking and the
state court ha[s] ruled that there was no property to take."' 22 Given
this review in legislative takings cases, it seems that the same type of
review should be applied in judicial takings cases. In both types of
cases, the court is redefining a previously existing property right out of
existence, and the effect on the individual property owner is the same.
It is true that "if the takings protections were applied to judicial
changes, the courts would be barred from revising property law to
meet societal and technological changes."'" But legislative and exec-
utive bodies, which are arguably more responsive to such changes, are
prohibited from changing the law without paying compensation.12 4
Allowing a court, whether acting on its own initiative or influenced by
the legislature, to engage in activities that would otherwise be consid-
ered takings is counter to the Just Compensation Clause's goal of pro-
tecting individual liberty."z
Professor Thompson notes that allowing courts to redefine property
without compensation also has implications for the effective function-
ing of government:
Exempting courts from the compensation requirements imposed on
other governmental bodies introduces an imbalance into political
decisionmaking that can push issues away from the legislature and
pensated for the lost easements of light, air, and access. At the turn of the
century, however, after the New York legislature ordered the New York &
Harlem Railroad to raise its tracks, the New York Court of Appeals ruled
adjacent property holders held no inconsistent easements and thus were not
due any compensation, overruling one of its contrary precedents and nar-
rowly distinguishing the others.
Thompson, supra note 108, at 1463-64 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the legislative action violated both the Just Compensation Clause
and the Contracts Clause. Muhlker, 197 U.S. at 570-71.
122. Thompson, supra note 108, at 1467 (citing Demorest v. City Bank Farmers
Trust, 321 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1944); Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S.
537, 540, aff'd on rehearing, 282 U.S. 187, 191 (1930); Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651, 654-57 (1927)).
123. Id at 1499.
124. See id. at 1466.
The common law process is clearly one, at least in part, of "trial and error,"
but so are the legislative and administrative processes. Courts change the
common law "to conform with changing ideas and conditions," but legisla-
tures and administrative agencies are constantly writing and revising statutes
and regulations for exactly the same purpose. No one would disagree in our
post-Erie federal system that it is for state courts to correct their errors. No
one has ever disagreed either that it is also for state legislatures and adminis-
trative agencies to correct their errors-except when that correction would
violate the Constitution.
Idt (footnotes omitted).
125. Allowing the government to take property without compensation through the
actions of the judiciary would defeat the essential purpose of the Just Compensation
Clause, which is to maintain individual property owners' material independence. See
supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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administrative agencies and into the courts. Legislative and admin-
istrative bodies, protective of their limited revenues, may defer
making legitimate and valuable changes in the hope that courts will
make them instead, with no cost to the taxpayers. Proponents of
change, to the extent that they must bear any significant portion of
compensation costs, may also push the issue towards the courts. In
response to the resulting pressure, courts may end up addressing
various issues that, in a balanced world, would be better resolved by
the other branches.' 2
6
Thus, both the protection of individual liberty and the effective func-
tioning of government require that judicial actions be subject to tak-
ings review.
Such scrutiny of state court findings would prohibit the courts from
reading existing property rights 27 out of existence and is necessary to
126. Thompson, supra note 108, at 1507.
127. While the courts should not be able to change existing property rights, there
arguably would be no Just Compensation problem if the state, either through the
legislature or judiciary, established a new property right explicitly subject to future
change. See id. at 1528. In such a case, the power to change the property right would
be reserved in the state, and changes would be legitimate exercises of the police
power. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. The property holder would be bet-
ter off with the contingent property right than with none at all, and such a view of
property rights would give states the freedom to create statutory entitlements that
would be prohibitively expensive if subject to due process requirements.
This was the view taken in Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Arnett v. Ken-
nedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). In Arnett, the statutory grant of the property right "ex-
pressly omitted the procedural guarantees which appellee insists are mandated by the
Constitution." IL at 152. The individual thus gained the benefits of the property
right, but these benefits were subject to the limitations inherent in the grant of that
right. In other words, in return for the benefit conferred, the individual "must take
the bitter with the sweet." Id. at 154.
Justice Rehnquist's position did not command a majority in Amen. Rather, six jus-
tices took the position that the state could define property but that it could not give
those rights less protection than is required by the Constitution. Id. at 185 (White, J.,
concurring and dissenting). This view was adopted by the Court a year after Arnett in
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975). More recently, the Court has stated the rule
as: "While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest ... it may not
constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without
appropriate procedural safeguards." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532, 541 (1985) (citing Arnett, 416 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring)).
What the state clearly cannot do is make existing property rights subject to future
change without compensation. In a classic example, Professor Michelman asserted
otherwise:
Suppose I buy scenic land along the highway during the height of public
discussion about the possibility of forbidding all development of such land,
and the market clearly reflects awareness that future restrictions are a signif-
icant possibility. If restrictions are ultimately adopted, have I a claim to be
compensated in the amount of the difference between the land's value with
restrictions and its value without them? Surely this would be a weak claim.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 29, at 1238.
The flaw in this example is that if the changes made by the proposed regulation
were compensable, the mere threat of regulation would not alter the market value of
the property significantly. The state cannot extinguish a property right by simply an-
nouncing its intention to regulate. See Epstein, supra note 27, at 156 ("If this were so,
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prevent the protection of the Just Compensation Clause from being a
mere illusion. The problem, as Professor Thompson notes, is based in
the uncertainty inherent in common law:
The only real difference between judicial takings and many regula-
tory takings is that the former force the reviewing court to confront
the indeterminacy of positive law.... The fact that judicial takings
highlights the vacuity of positive property, however, should not dis-
tract us from the fact that the same vacuity also threatens the coher-
ence of much of our regulatory takings jurisprudence.128
Given this uncertainty, the need to review state court findings is pres-
ent in any regulatory takings case to prevent courts from using the
flexibility of common law to place the cost of the common good on an
individual property owner.
C. Federal Review of State Property Law Decisions
If scrutinizing state court findings on property law is necessary to
maintain the integrity of the Just Compensation Clause, the next ques-
tion involves what form this scrutiny should take.129 TWo possibilities
suggest themselves. The first would be to create a federal property
law establishing those rights that are protected by the Just Compensa-
tion Clause. The second would be to have federal courts review state
court decisions to determine whether they were based on legitimate
the government could gain title over land by announcing its intention to regulate or,
for that matter, to confiscate it. No private party obtains rights by simply declaring a
refusal to pay, and the state fares no better...."). In Micheman's example, the seller
would transfer the right to develop to the buyer, id. at 155, because the right to de-
velop was still in the seller's bundle of rights and not yet reserved in the state. If the
regulation is enacted after the sale, then compensation would be paid to the buyer. If
the regulation is enacted before the sale, then compensation would be paid the
seller. The point is that if a property right is extinguished by a regulation, then com-
pensation has to be paid to whoever owns that right at the time of enactment of the
regulation. It seems self-evident that the state cannot do by discussion what it cannot
do by enactment of a regulation.
The same logic applies to judicial findings. Thus, the Supreme Court of South Car-
olina could not have gotten out of the compensation problem by arguing:
Law, for us, is an adaptive body of general principles, not a frozen list of
sharply specific rules and rulings. Citizenship here encompasses responsibil-
ity for constantly adjusting one's actions and expectations to that evolving
body of principles, among which-we need hardly point out-are principles
of deference by all to common needs and interests of the people of South
Carolina that from time to time gain wide recognition as important.
Michelman, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 25, at 315. Taking the Arnett view of
contingent property rights, such a holding might serve to make property rights estab-
lished after the pronouncement subject to change. But it cannot serve to write an
established, non-conditional property right out of existence.
128. Thompson, supra note 108, at 1537.
129. Professor Thompson acknowledged the existence of this issue, but did not sug-
gest an answer to it. See id. at 1544 ("By applying the takings protections to the judici-
ary .... [w]e may also force the courts to reexamine some of the more difficult, but
frequently submerged, issues in our takings jurisprudence-particularly the definition
of property for constitutional purposes.").
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common law precedent or amounted to a revision of state property
law.
The first possibility, establishing a federal property law, would re-
quire the Court to establish a set of property rights that would be
protected by the Just Compensation Clause. The states would be re-
quired only to protect these enumerated property rights; any addi-
tional property rights recognized by the state would not be protected
by the Fifth Amendment. Arguably, the Court already follows this
approach in takings cases. As Professor Tribe noted, the Court has
tended to extend takings protection to certain traditional property
rights while not protecting untraditional property rights.' 30 Professor
Michelman has suggested that the Lucas Court described property "in
places as if there is just one American background law of property.' 131
But in Lucas, the Court made it clear that state law defines prop-
erty.1' Moreover, the Court consistently has rejected the idea that
there is a federal law of property.133 Informing the Court's position is
a federalism-based concern that defining property is beyond the scope
of the federal government's authority and that, therefore, the task of
defining property is properly left to the states.Y Furthermore, limit-
ing the protection of the Just Compensation Clause through a federal
law of property is contrary to the libertarian goal of maximizing the
protection of individual liberty.135
If the Court is not going to establish a federal law of property but
still maintain the protection of the Just Compensation Clause, it must
review state court determinations of property to ensure conformity
with existing property law. The problem is that while the Just Com-
pensation Clause uses the term "property," which federalism requires
be defined by state law, the clause clearly is designed to protect the
individual from state action. 36 The result is "that effective national
judicial protection for property must mean giving federal judges the
130. Tribe, supra note 9, § 9-7, at 608-13.
131. Michelman, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 25, at 319; see Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992) ("[T]he 'interest in land'
that Lucas has pleaded (a fee simple interest) is an estate with a rich tradition of
protection at common law.").
132. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901 ("It seems unlikely that common-law principles
would have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on
petitioner's land; they rarely support prohibition on the 'essential use' of land. The
question, however, is one of state law .... " (citation omitted)).
133. See Delaware v. New York, 113 S. Ct. 1550, 1557 (1993); Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986, 1001 (1984); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161
(1980); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980); Bishop v. Wood,
426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972).
134. See Michelmian, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 25, at 306.
135. See supra part LC.
136. See Michelman, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 25, at 305-06.
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last word on questions of the meanings of laws emanating from state
authorities. ' ' "3
This type of federal review was advocated by Justice Stewart in
Hughes v. Washington.138 Concurring in the Court's decision, Justice
Stewart wrote:
We cannot resolve the federal question whether there has been such
a taking without first making a determination of [who owned the
property in question]. To the extent that the decision of the
Supreme Court of Washington on that issue arguably conforms to
reasonable expectations, we must of course accept it as conclusive.
But to the extent that it constitutes a sudden change in state law,
unpredictable in terms of the relevant precedents, no such defer-
ence would be appropriate. For a State cannot be permitted to de-
feat the constitutional prohibition against taking property without
due process of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively
that the property it has taken never existed at all. Whether the deci-
sion here worked an unpredictable change in state law thus inevita-
bly presents a federal question for the determination of this Court.
The Washington court insisted that its decision was "not startling."
What is at issue here is the accuracy of that characterization. 139
In advocating review of state court decisions, Justice Stewart was not
merely referring to property owners' reasonable expectations.
Rather, his reasonable expectations language can be understood to
refer to the fact that,
[r]ead at any single point in time, decisions often point us to a par-
ticular conclusion-even while they, and the structure of our law
more generally, leave a foundation for change. It is these decisional
signals that permit lawyers to offer opinions to clients and allow
treatise writers to summarize the law.140
In other words, common law precedent is often clear enough to deter-
mine whether a common law property right exists. This characteristic
of common law allows a reviewing court to decide whether the state
court was legitimately following precedent or was redefining property
to avoid a takings problem.
Reading Lucas to be sympathetic to this kind of review, Professor
Michelman objects that such inquiry is in conflict with judicial federal-
ism.' 41 The consequence of Lucas, Professor Michelman asserts, is
to federalize the law of land use in a peculiarly profound way. The
effect is to make the ... Taking Clause ... dictate to the States the
jurisprudential spirit in which their general laws of property and
137. Id at 305.
138. 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
139. It. at 296-97 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
140. Thompson, supra note 108, at 1539 (footnote omitted).
141. See Michelnan, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 25, at 310.
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nuisance are to be read and construed, whether contained in legisla-
tive enactments or judicial decisions.142
But such federalization of state land use law is in no way peculiar; it
merely requires that state courts interpret the law in a manner consis-
tent with the Constitution, rather than in a way that subverts the indi-
vidual liberty that the Constitution protects. As Professor Michelman
notes, federal review of the state courts has strong implications for
federalism. The implications for federalism, however, are inherent in
the constitutional design, because the Fifth Amendment protects an
interest, property, that is defined by the states. Behind Professor
Michelman's federalism objection is an attempt to find an inconsis-
tency between two "projects" that he attributes to judicial conserva-
tives: promoting federalism and protecting private property.143 The
supposed inconsistency rests on Professor Michelman's assertion that
protection of private property is a conservative project. It may be
that, but it is also a libertarian project.'" Federal review of state court
property findings protects individual liberty while infringing on feder-
alism far less than would a federal law of property. The Court consist-
ently has scrutinized the state courts in their protection of other
constitutional liberties. 45 The Just Compensation Clause should not
be an exception.
The Court should explicitly adopt Justice Stewart's Hughes v. Wash-
ington test, while avoiding the problematic "reasonable expecta-
tions."'146 State court findings in just compensation cases should be
reviewed to ensure that they define property using legitimate statu-
tory and common law precedent, rather than using the inherent flexi-
bility of common law to define property rights out of existence. If the
state courts previously have recognized a property interest, either be-
142. Id. at 327; see also Thompson, supra note 108, at 1509. Professor Thompson
notes:
Both jurists and scholars have also objected to a doctrine of judicial takings
on federalism grounds. Indeed, the most frequently heard objection is that
the development and specification of property law is a matter for the state
courts, and that federal courts should not interfere with this process through
assertion of the takings protections. By extending the takings protections to
the courts, federal courts would be controlling the rate and nature of change
in state property law-and thus to an extent federalizing that law.
Id (footnote omitted).
143. Michelman, Judicial Conservatism, supra note 25, at 302-03.
144. See supra part I.A.
145. See Thompson, supra note 108, at 1456-57. Professor Thompson notes:
The Supreme Court has unhesitatingly extended most of the noneconomic
restrictions of the Constitution to judicial actions, even in the face of express
constitutional language to the contrary. The first amendment, for example,
provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." Yet, the Supreme Court has applied this protection
to the actions of both state and federal courts.
Id. (alteration in original).
146. See supra part II.B.
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tween private individuals 147 or between an individual and the state,
then the state cannot destroy that interest without compensation.
Such a requirement would accomodate the desire to have the state's
property law serve as the primary source of the definition of property,
while maintaining the protection of liberty required by the Just Com-
pensation Clause.
CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of the Just Compensation Clause is to protect
individual liberty by requiring the government to pay compensation
when its actions to benefit the common good infringe on private prop-
erty rights. The compensation requirement ensures that the individ-
ual's ability to function independently of the government will not be
impaired by a loss of property. The definition of "property" must
serve these libertarian ends of the Just Compensation Clause. Pro-
tecting property owners' expectations regarding their property is an
important goal of property rights, allowing individuals to function ef-
fectively in a complex, capitalist society. But because expectations are
so indefinite, they cannot serve as a source of the definition of prop-
erty. Rather, as the Court has often asserted, property must be de-
fined by state property law. To protect property owners' individual
liberty, state governments must be prohibited from changing property
law without compensation, regardless of whether that change is made
by the executive, legislature, or judiciary. State court decisions on
property law must be subject to federal review to ensure that they are
based on legitimate precedent and that they are not merely writing
existing property rights out of existence to avoid paying just compen-
sation. Such federal review would be an affront to federalism. But
this infringement on federalism is inherent in the design of the Fifth
Amendment and has far fewer federalism implications than establish-
ing a federal law of property to supersede state law. Federal review is
necessary to prohibit the Just Compensation Clause's protection of
individual freedom from becoming an illusion. Combining federal re-
view with the Lucas categorical rule and conceptual severance results
in the following test for regulatory takings: Any government action,
whether legislative, executive, or judicial, that destroys all value of any
discrete property interest, as defined by state law subject to federal
review, is a per se taking and demands compensation.
147. Forcing the state to respect property rights that it had recognized between
individuals would serve the goal of placing the state in the same position as an adja-
cent property owner. See supra note 68.
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